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3I. INTRODUCTION
A. Ethnoregionalist parties and the European Union: a neglected link
The analysis of the impact of European integration on ethnoregionalist parties (ERPs) in Europe
has up until now received very little scholarly attention. This lacuna is partially due to the lack of
comparative research treating this group of parties as a genuine European party family. Most comparative
analyses of European parties just omit this family, in spite of the fact that, for different reasons (see
below) one can expect that the impact of European integration to be particularly strong on this party
family, the fact that the Democratic Party of the Peoples of Europe/European Free Alliance defines itself
(together with the EPP, PES, ELDR, EFGP) as a genuine European political party (conform to art. 138a
of the European Union-Treaty), and that the other four europarties treat the DPPE-EFA as a genuine
europarty1. This neglect is reinforced by the feeble representation of ethnoregionalist parties in terms of
seats in the European Parliament, which is in the first place due to the relatively small size of the regions
in which they compete for votes (De Winter & Türsan, 1998)2. Finally, ethnicity in modern societies is
often seen as an anachronism and particularly within the context of an integrated Europe and gradual
functional disappearance of the old nation-states.
However, for this party family, European integration is highly significant, as this process
radically modifies -and generally in a positive way- the structure of opportunities of regions and
ethnoregionalist parties.
B. Definition of Europeanisation of political parties
Drawing from a variety of approaches to the study of Europeanisation and of political party change3, we
would like to define the process of Europeanisation of political parties as follows:
Europeanisation of political parties can be defined as the dual, gradual, interactive and
differentiated process of the emergence and development at the European level of
distinct political parties (in terms of party in the electorate, party in office, party
organisation, party policy preferences), party system(s), party government and linkage
systems, the growth of policy networks permitting a partisan element in the elaboration,
decision-making and implementation and legitimisation of authoritative European
rules, through bottom-up, top-down and elitist interactions, and, at the same time, at the
national and subnational level, the gradual and differentiated process of adaptation of
parties, party systems and party governments and linkage systems to the development of
parties at the European level, in, on the one hand, a direct way through multilevel
interaction within these Europarties, and, on the other hand, indirectly by adapting to
the effects that the wider process of development of European institutions and policies
have on the national and regional structure of opportunities and constraints in which
domestic parties operate. This adaptation will differ between parties and countries
depending on the nature of existing national cleavages structures, the political and
administrative cultures and institutions, party organisational structures, the
predominance of office, vote, and policy seeking objectives, and concrete (bargaining)
opportunities regarding (continued) government participation.
Hence, the necessity to define this process in a multilevel, multidirectional, multidimensional
and multidisciplinary way indicates that the task of studying the Europeanisation of parties, even of a
single and “small” party family, is a gigantic task of uncommon complexity to party researchers4, tha  in
4practice only can be handled by a network of researchers, preferably constituted of specialists in a
particular party per country. Hence, in this paper, we will only try to make a modest contribution to the
field. First we present an overview of the theoretical arguments regarding the different types of effects
that European integration may have on ethnoregionalist parties, that are typical for this party family. We
will omit theories and hypotheses on general impact of European Union on all types of domestic parties,
as Ladrech (2000), Bartolini (1999), Katz (1999) and others have formulated them. In a second part we
will present some partial empirical data on the adaptation of ethnoregionalist parties to European
integration. In a later stage, we will formulate some hypotheses regarding the different impact
Europeanisation may have on different types of ethnoregionalist parties, following the line of Marks
(1999).
C. Definition of ethnoregionalist parties
From the plethora of labels and definitions that one finds in the literature, we prefer to use the
term “ethnoregionalist” parties that we define on the basis of the two common denominators that unite
them: 1) a subnational territorial division; 2) a population that the ethnoregionalist party pretends to
constitutes a category that is culturally distinct and has an exclusive group identity. Their
programmatically most defining characteristic is their demand for empowerment of the ethnoregional
collectivity (De Winter, 1994: 28; Türsan, 1998: 5). This demands thus calls for the reorganisation of the
power structure of the national political system, for a certain degree of self-government for the region.
This degree can vary from cultural protectionism to straigthforward separatism (De Winter, 1998).
Viewed from the perspective of a process of transfers of competencies from the national level to
a higher level (and in federal and regional states, also competencies that belong to the regions and federal
states), European integration undoubtedly constitutes an amplification of the “democratic deficit” defined
in terms of distance between decision-makers and the beneficiaries of public policies5. Th s, more than
for other party families, European integration strikes at the heart of the cleavage on which this party
family is build, i.e. the empowerment/dispowerment of a higher level decision-making centre and the
regional periphery opposition.
However, for a variety of reasons, as integration proceeded these parties have not turned into
Euroscepticals, rather on the contrary. In fact, in some recent analyses the use of the European Union
context as a resource is considered as one of the defining and innovative aspects of “neo-nationalism”
(McCrone 1998).
II. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON
ETHNOREGIONALIST PARTIES
A. The European Union as a constraint on the development of ethnoregionalist parties and their
constituency
1. The European Union as a threat to regional empowerment
5Historically, the founding fathers of European integration were strongly anti-nationalist, as
nationalism in all it forms was considered as the main cause to the “European civil war” that ran from
1933 to 1945 (Hobsbawm, 1992). The European Coal and Steel Community intended to put the basic
industry necessary for (French and German) re-armament under supranational control. The creation of
Euratom was inspired by similar objectives. European integration essentially aims at diminishing the
sovereignty of the national state and therefore the ambition of some historic regions to become new states
in the 19th century sense may appear anachronistic.
European integration represents a process of centralisation of the decision-making process.
Initially restricted to the economic activities linked to re-armament, this centralisation has spread into
other sectors of economic and monetary policy making, recently starting to include aspects of foreign
policy, national defence and internal security. This process should logically widen the gap between, on
the one hand, regional populations and beneficiaries of public policies and, on the other hand, the main
decision-making centres regarding policies relevant to the populations that ethnoregional parties want to
empower.
In addition, European integration and economic globalisation may exacerbate territorial
disparities, further peripheralise marginal regions and reinforce the stronger regions (in the “golden
triangle” or “blue banana”). The accentuation of these regional disparities and occurrence of
asymmetrical shock can not anymore be countered by public intervention: regions can not devaluate their
currency in order to restore competitiveness, European Union competition policy prohibits state subsides
to ailing industrial sectors concentrated in certain regions, the use of deficit spending and the
manipulation of interest rates have severely been restricted by the convergence criteria of the Maastricht
Treaty (De Grauwe, 2000). In spite of the rhetorical and genuine efforts for European Union regional and
structural funds policy, the budget for reducing regional disparities remains on the average below 2% of
GDP of European Union member states. In ddition, economic disparities are reinforced by political ones:
in the most marginal regions -in which European Union regional policies constitute a considerable part of
the Gross Regional Product- party political ethnoregional mobilisation is generally weak, while
ethnoregionalist parties tend to flourish most strongly in the richer regions (Fearon & Van Houten, 1998).
European integration poses also a series of political and constitutional challenges to the regions,
as European Union competencies also affect those policy domains devoluted to regions in federal states6
(hence the insertion of art. 146 of Maastricht Treaty allowing regional ministers to represent their country
in the Council of Ministers for matters decided in their country on the regional level). In addition, the
most important channel of access of regions to the European Union decision-making process is their
national government. The better regional interests are integrated in the national policy making system, the
better they will be looked after in Brussels (Keating, 1998: 166).
Whitehead (1996) argues that the desire of uniformity in European structures may cause
countries with asymmetrical federalism (like Spain and Belgium) to revise their structures of authority
between regions and the centre, through for instance a standardised interpretation of the concept of
subsidiarity. Inevitably, the most empowered regions would loose in this process.
6Finally, some authors like Milward (1992: 3) argue no less that European integration has rescued
the ethnoregionalist parties main enemy, i.e. the nation-state: “without the process of integration the West
European nation-state might not have retained the allegiance and support of its citizens in the way that it
has. The European Community has been its buttress, an indispensable part of the nation-state's post-war
construction. Without it, the nation-state could not have offered to its citizens the same measure of
security and prosperity which it has provided and which has justified its survival”. The rescue of the
nation-state in the context of increased post-war interdependence required the delegation of competencies.
The nation-states followed a strategy of integration because this was “(...) one way of formalising,
regulating and perhaps limiting the consequences of interdependence, without forfeiting the national
allegiance on which its continued existence depends” (Milward, 1992: 19).
Thus European integration implies a variety of changes that constrain the emancipation of
“nations without states” and the expansion of their main representatives, the ethnoregionalist parties.
Hence, it comes as no surprise that at the take off of this process some main ethnoregionalist parties
opposed European integration given the perspective of the widening of the gap between regional
populations and supranational decision-making centres (Lynch, 1998). However, as Europeanisation of
decision-making expanded and accelerated, paradoxically their Eurosceptical position gradually evolved
into a rather strong europhile stand.
2. The feeble European integration of ethnoregionalist parties as a party family
At this moment, the most concrete form of European integration of the family of ethnoregionalist
parties is the Democratic Party of the Peoples of Europe-European Free Alliance that rallies most
regionalist and autonomist parties in Europe (see Table).
The co-operation between ethnoregionalist parties in the European Parliament underwent
different phases that illustrate well the problems with founding a genuine transeuropean party (Lynch,
1998). After the 1979 elections, the members of the DPPE-EFA formed a technical group with some
extreme-left parties. In the following legislature, this group was enlarged with the greens (the “Rainbow”
group). Only in the 1989-1994 legislature, a homogenous ethnoregionalist parliamentary group was
formed. From 1994 to 1999, the remaining three MEPs representing DPPE-EFA parties joined the French
and Italian radicals (the European Radical Alliance group), while in the current parliament, the ten MEPs
of the DPPE-EFA joined the green group (that now counts in total 48 MEPs). In short, apart from one
legislature, the DPPE-EFA representation in the European parliament has never been sufficiently strong
to form a genuine ethnoregionalist parliamentary group. In addition, in most cases, the ethnoregionalist
MEPs constituted a small minority in the group they joined7. Thus, given the lack of representation in the
European Parliament, most parties of the DPPE-EFA have been excluded from the party integration
opportunities that the parliamentary arena offers (Hix & Lord, 1997).
In addition, several important ethnoregionalist parties prefer to adhere to other parliamentary
groups, which further undermines the representative character of the DPPE-EFA. After the 1999
elections, there are in fact ten MEPs belonging to ethnoregionalist parties that are not member of the
7DPPE-EFA, thus as much as those that currently belong to the DPPE-EFA parties. The most notorious
outsiders are the Lega Nord, the CiU, the SFP, the StVP and EH. Note however that the current numerical
balance between DPPE-EFA members and non-members is unprecedented, indicating an evolution in
favour of the DPPE-EFA. The preceding parliament, for example, counted only three ethnoregionalist
MEPs belonging to the DPPE-EFA against eleven non-members.
In short, at the level of the European Parliament, the DPPE-EFA is neither inclusive as
transnational party, nor predominant in the definition of the political outlook of the parliamentary group
to which it belongs. This constitutes a serious handicap in comparison with other European party families
that are clearly more inclusive and homogenous, and thus more representative of the ideological tendency
they articulate8.
3. The limited extraparliamentary access of ethnoregionalist parties to European Union-decision-
making
While the four other party families have privileged extraparliamentary9 ccess to the European
Union-decision making bodies (Council and Commission), due to their participation in national
executives and their nomination influence on the commission, these channels of influence and co-
ordination are not open to ethnoregionalist parties, as currently (apart from the Lega) no ethnoregionalist
party participates in national government, and very few have done so in the past, at least for a significant
period (De Winter, 1998: 236)10.
Due to this absence in the major European Union-decision making bodies, the DPPE-EFA does
not hold europarty summits before the European Council, and therefore lacks a forum of informal
integration of party leaders and their strategies, as well as an opportunity for gaining visibility as a party
family, for voicing its visions on European Union and other matters, and for credit claiming. Only in
November 2000, the DPPE-EFA organised its first conference of party leaders and ministers in regional
and big city executives.
A paradoxical consequence of this absence of ethnoregionalist parties in national governments is
that it pushes ethnoregionalist parties to support even more supranational federal decision making models,
but in the form of a federal model in which the regions are recognised, as well as a fully empowered
European Parliament (in which the ethnoregionalist parties are fairly represented).
4. The potential negative impact of future developments
A number of future institutional developments of the European Union may further weaken the
representation of ethnoregionalist parties and their regions.
a) Enlargement
Although the EFA is traditional transeuropean and therefore in principal supports the
enlargement of the European Union to the East-European countries, it is opposed to its present conditions
of enlargement, especially the freezing of the maximum number of MEPs to 700 (raised at the Nice
8summit). As the EFA MEPs are usually elected on marginal seats (the last rest seats to be attributed in the
constituency), an enlargement with no linear expansion of the number of MEPs would reduce the number
of available seats in the constituencies in which they compete, and thus decimate the parliamentary
representation of the EFA (and probably also of the Greens and some liberal parties).
In addition, the new candidates do not fit well the rokkanite cleavage world, especially regarding
the centre-periphery cleavage. Apart from some problems of protection of cross-border minorities, all
current east-European countries are “nations with a state”. Thus, instead of being representatives of a
relevant cleavage in one third of the European Union members (5/15), the relevance would be reduced to
one fifth or less. In addition, the new europarty statutes may (although the most recent proposals tend to
be more lenient) request representation in one third of member countries, at national or regional level:
with fifteen countries this is means getting MEPs elected in five countries, an attainable threshold for the
DPPE. Under a hypothetical enlargement to 24, representation in at least eight countries will be the norm,
and thus highly problematic given the general absence of significant ethnoregionalist parties in Eastern
Europe11.
b) Common pool of Eurodeputies
The suggestion of the creation of a common pool of MEPs that would be elected in
transeuropean or transborder constituencies (cf. report 1998 Anastassopoulos on common electoral
principles) would strongly reduce the number of ethnoregionalist party MEPs (under the likely condition
that this pool of European MEPs would be deducted from the maximum of 700), given the marginal
character of most ethnoregionalist parties seats.
c) The European Party Statute
The report of the European Court of Auditors (13/2000) and the recommendation of the Group
of Eminent Persons on the statute for members (June 2000) have strongly criticised the way of financing
MEPs, EP-groups, europarties. The current system is highly questionable and vulnerable to abuse, fraud,
exploitation and personal enrichment. This makes the European Parliament, the EP-groups and
europarties highly vulnerable to critique and even legal action, especially in the post-Cresson
transparency and clean hands public mood. The EFA has, more than other europarties, been exclusively
dependent on EP-subsidies to support its activities as an europarty, an improper use of EP-funds that will
become less and less possible. Therefore, it will become even more dependent of the willingness of the
European Union to finance directly the Europarties, which is the ultimate aim of the proposal of
installation of a European statute.
In any case, given the rather proportional allocation of EP subsidies to groups, and given the fact
that the same parliamentary work is shared by much less MEPs in the EFA than for instance in the PES or
EPP, all parliamentary assistants allotted to EFA MEPs do in fact perform assistance to their MEPs, while
in the larger europarties often one of two dozen of “parliamentary” assistants work exclusively for the
development of the europarty, and not at all for the group. However, parliamentary assistants of the EFA
do party work “on the side” of their parliamentary work, this is even the case for the Secretary General of
the EFA who follows a number of EP commissions. Thus, if the new eurostatute would consolidate the
present allocation of staff to the europarties while exerting stricter control on the use of EP-resources, the
9EFA may have fewer personnel at its disposal than under the present arrangement.
d) Enforced intergovernmentalism
A common europessimistic view is that European Union will return to being an
intergovernmental organisation, especially after enlargement. This backlash would empower national
parties and weaken the europarties. While some national parties (especially those with a permanent
government status) may welcome this development, for the ethnoregionalist parties this re-empowerment
of national governments and their supporting parties would be a backlash for their own expansion, given
the fact that the federal development of the European Union has always been considered as a way to get
around the national state, and to relatively empower the regions and ethnoregionalist parties. Hence, not
only European Union-integration, but also its potential modes of disintegration can influence party
families in different ways12.
B. The European Union as an opportunity for the development of ethnoregionalist parties and their
constituency
1. Rendering void arguments against Kleinstaaterei
European integration, together with other forms of international integration and co-operation, the
enlargement of scale of traditional state functions, and the globalisation of economic activity, have
weakened the classical arguments against Kleinstaaterei (Hobsbawm, 1992: 31).
First, the creation of customs and a monetary union has brought economies of scale within reach
even for small producing countries. Their products have gained access to large markets, while also
international producers have found small countries attractive for investments, as long as they were part of
an open economy and supportive of business interests by specific development programs.
Second, for those regions that aspire independence, the introduction of the euro solves the
problem of monetary transaction costs that a new independent region-state would face, creating its own
currency and defending it on international markets, during a transition period most likely characterised by
turmoil and disorder typical for separatist processes. Katz (1999) argues that reduction of national
sovereignty, (especially the cession of control over monetary policy to the European Central Bank) might
be expected to undermine the position of the state both as the primary object old political identity and
loyalty.
Finally, the success of NATO indicates that in the nuclear age, even former European
superpowers like France and the UK have to appeal for their defence to a larger international co-operation
in order to perform this function essential to the classical nation-state. In a certain sense, also large
countries have become Kleinstaaten, not capable anymore of performing classical state functions in a
satisfactory way.
Hence, the new international institutional context, on the one hand, has been a successful answer
to the incapacity of West-European nation-states to guarantee their physical and economic security
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permitted states to survive and prosper (Milward, 1992), (and not only small ones like the Benelux,
Denmark and Ireland, but by now also the larger ones) while, on the other hand, it has reduced the
economic and military costs of the option of “independence within Europe” and thus, but while
temporarily rescuing the nation-state, it has eroded its long-term main raison-d'être.
2. European Union and regional development
Europe has massively invested in regional policies that accord to the poorest regions a
substantial economic support, which they otherwise would not have obtained from the state to which they
belong.
These programs have reinforced the regions as a relevant decision-making level, even in states
where regions did not exist or lack significant competencies (Keating, 1998: 176; Keating and Jones,
1995; Le Galès and Lequesne, 1998). The European Union regional policies require solid partners at the
regional level, in the phase of policy preparation as well as its implementation. Apart from political
partners (like regional and local executives), the European commission invites also interest groups to
participate in these phases. The regions are thus forced to constitute themselves as competent actors to
represent their regional interests in Brussels, and this through a multitude of channels of access to
European Union decision-making (Commission, Council, Parliament, Committee of the Regions and
other forms of co-operation between regions and cities, lobbies, etc.). This decision making model
facilitates or reinforces policy networks between political, socio-economic, administrative actors, at the
regional level as well as at the (inter-)communal, transregional and transborder level13. Katz (1999)
argues that under the old regime, regions within a single state would often be in competition with one
another over resources or regulatory decisions. However, when the questions transcended national
boundaries, they would be forced to make common cause, if only because the negotiations would be
made on a state-to-state basis. Under the European Union-regime, the ability of national governments
both to make decisions or conduct negotiations or to enforce decisions or compromises within their
borders (in the face of potential flight to another European Union country) has been severely reduced.
Katz argues that this has resulted in the formation of cross-border alliances of regional interests in
competition with other cross-border- alliances, both to influence policy made at the European Union
level, and particularly, in the case of those who expect to lose at the national level, to have the locus of
decision shifted to an arena in which they expect to be relatively, stronger (Katz and Wessels, 1999: 239-
240). Also, the European Union opens the possibility of appeal or renegotiation of decisions reached at
the national level.
At the symbolic level, this decision-making process has projected regions and regional
politicians into the European arena, presenting them as important participants in the European Union
policy process14. They allow regional politicians to take credit for attractive European Union subsidies,
even those that would have come in any case simply by the working of the relevant eligibility rules
(Keating, 1998: 170). In the regions in which an ethnoregionalist party is hegemonic or predominant, the
leaders of these parties cash in the symbolic dividends, while in the regions with feeble ethnoregionalist
mobilisation, state-wide parties take most credit. Thus the European Union institutional development may
alter established career patterns, promoting the attractiveness of regional office holding.
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Morlino (1999) and Ladrech (2000) argue that on the one hand, the role of national party
leadership in the European Union governing bodies is weak: the decisive communication and exchange
networks connect the European Union-bureaucracy, the domestic and European interest groups, the
country-specific bureaucratic branches, and the experts in the field. In the implementation process of
European social and economic policies at local and regional levels, local institutions, and in some cases
local and regional politicians, are able to preserve a large space for policy definition and innovation with
opportunities for bargaining and making new proposals by directly entering the European Community
arena. Local political leaders with entrepreneurial skill have day-to-day possibilities of performing a key
role in these European policies. Also, these levels of government seem to develop and diffuse know-how
regarding European Union-matters that is much more developed than that of political personnel at the
national level.
When a policy decision-making level gains in importance in terms of issue salience and prestige,
political and socio-economic actors will gradually pay more attention to it, in terms of political personnel
and campaign resources, and will tailor their programs to respond better to socio-economic as well as
identity demands of the region15. If we follow Newman's (1994: 41) logic, who claims that the creation of
regional policies by European states in the 1950s and 1960s rather than their policy centralising
tendencies, were at the basis of the breakthrough of ethnoregionalist parties in the 1960s and 1970s, we
can expect that the European Union recognition of the regions through its cohesion policy making
process, will have the same effect. In fact, in both cases the objective was the same: to reduce unequal
regional development. The states tried to enhance the fair distribution of the benefits of the expanding
welfare state, the post-war economic recovery and boom, while the structural and cohesion policy of the
European Union is an attempt to help the weaker regions of Europe to bridge the development gap with
the richer regions whose fortune would be further enhanced by the realisation of the Internal Market. But
contrary to the centralised and technocratic regional development programs of the national states in the
1960s, the European Union has from the beginning tried to incorporate regional actors. The principle of
subsidiarity and additionality but also the necessity of lobbying are additional elements that may give
regional cohesion policies a stronger supportive impact on the development of ethnoregionalist parties
than the preceding national waves of regional policies16.
Finally, the launching of the principle of subsidiarity, which was originally intended only to
regulate the division of competencies between the European Union and the national states, has been
seized by the Committee of the Regions and other regional platforms, as to be applicable (and by now
justiciable) also to the division of competencies between regions, on the one hand, and the European
Union as well as the national states, on the other hand.
3. Shift towards territorial representation
Bartolini (1999) argues that, generally, the European Union will make the territorial type of
political representation more important vis-à-vis the electoral (and maybe) interest representation modes.
Thus, ethnoregionalist parties, as inclusive, catch-all spokespersons of the interest of the entire regional
population, should be more favoured by this new predominance of the territorial mode, in comparison
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with traditional parties that represent crossregional categorical or ideological electorates.
4. European elections as a springboard for the mobilisation of ethnoregionalist parties
According to Lynch (1996), most ethnoregionalist parties obtain generally better results at the
European elections than at the parliamentary elections in their country. Several factors can explain this
better performance at the European level:
1) Even when amongst new parties, ethnoregionalist parties are the least vulnerable to the
sanctions imposed on third parties by a majoritarian electoral system -given that by definition the
electorate of a ethnoregionalist party is territorially strongly concentrated and therefore controls more
often a relative majority in a number of single-member constituencies- the electoral systems in use at the
European elections are in most cases less disadvantageous to ethnoregionalist parties than the one used
for general elections.
First, at the European elections, the average size of constituencies (in terms of seats to be
conquered), is in all countries with significant ethnoregionalist participation larger than for general
elections. This larger size should reduce strategic voting and enhance the proportionality of the allocation
of seats (Lijphart, 1994: 98-100).
Second, France, Great Britain and Italy (for three-quarters of the seats) are the only European
countries using a plurality system for their general elections. But for the European elections, these three
countries have adopted a multi-member system (Great Britain for the first time in 1999).
These differences in electoral rules (larger constituencies and generalisation of the use of
proportional representation) should work in favour of ethnoregionalist parties: with an equal number of
votes at the European and general elections, they should receive a number of seats in Strasbourg more in
proportion to their electoral support. Still, most regionalist parties believe that there is an even better
alternative: an electoral system with constituencies that would coincide with the region.
In fact, if one compares the degree of disproportionality (the percentage in terms of votes minus
the percentage in terms of seats) at the 1999 European elections to the preceding general elections, the
degree of disproportionality is -for all ethnoregionalist parties except for the SFP- lower at the European
elections. Thus also for hegemonic or predominant ethnoregionalist parties, that we could expect to profit
from under a more disproportional system.
2) The European elections facilitate the formation of cartels between ethnoregionalist parties of
different regions17 that for the general elections necessarily run separately. At the 1999 elections, one
finds two significant ethnoregionalist cartels (in terms of seats): the Coalición Europa (comprising the
Coalición Canaria, the Partido Andalucista, the Union Valenciana and the Partido Aragonés) and the
Coalición Nacionalista Europa de los Pueblos (comprising the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Eusko
Alkartasuna, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and Unió Mallorquina)18. Given the nation wide
constituency used for these elections in Spain, the formation of such electoral “coalitions” was the most
efficient way to fight the dilution of votes for these parties.
3) Turnout at the European lections is noticeably lower than for general elections.
Ethnoregionalist parties seem to profit from this lower turnout as their voters participate more eagerly at
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the European elections than those of their statewide competitors. The ethnoregionalist electorate in fact
displays a number of socio-political characteristics that enhances participation: young voters, men, a high
level of education attainment, (new) middle class origin, are -or were19- overrepresented (Blondel, Sinnott
& Svensson, 1998: 200-215; De Winter, 1998; Ackaert & De Winter, 1993, ICPS, 1998). The typical
voter of these parties corresponds to the “new voter” of the area of “citizen politics” or “new politics”, of
the “dealigned protest voter” who is most likely to abandon traditional parties.
4) As European elections are often considered as “second order elections”20, in which citizens'
votes are determined more by parties' national programs and governmental performance rather than their
stands on European issues, parties that do not govern at the national level (which is the case for most
ethnoregionalist parties) tend to obtain a better result at the European than at the national elections. This
is due to the fact that, on the one hand, European elections offer the opportunity for dissatisfied followers
of governing parties to manifest their disagreement with government policies21. This mid-term anti-
incumbent party vote is facilitate by the fact that the consequences of voting rebellion are less decisive, as
the European elections do not affect the formation of national executives. Thus, in European elections, the
electorate of traditional parties is more open for alternative views and messages of the smaller opposition
parties. The transfer of votes provoked by the malaise towards governmental parties -illustra ed at he last
European elections by the flagrant defeat of the social-democratic parties in most of the 13 countries in
which this family participates in the national government- wo ks partially in favour of ethnoregionalist
parties.
5) Finally, for ethnoregionalist parties campaigning for European elections is comparatively
cheaper than for general elections. As mentioned above, the number of constituencies is smaller, often
coinciding with the entire region (or the entire country). These parties have to recruit fewer candidates,
and can focus their campaign resources on a few top leaders. In addition, the European Parliament
allocates generous subsidies to parties that obtained seats in the outgoing Parliament. This can neutralise
or attenuate certain imbalances provoked by the lack of a system of public party finance at the national
level.
While Lynch (1996) formulated his hypotheses on the basis of an inquiry that included only four
ethnoregionalist parties, De Winter's (2000) analysis22 shows that for the entire 1979-1999 period most
ethnoregionalist parties indeed obtain better results at European than at general elections. Thus, generally
ethnoregionalist parties also get a more proportional share of offices in the European Parliament in
comparison with their national legislature23, nd this seems also to hold for their representation in the
Committee of the regions, as in many countries, the centre has been generous to allot in a disproportional
way (in comparison to regional population size) seats also to the smallest historical regions (like Val
d'Aoste) which are usually captured by the main ethnoregional party.
5. Positive attitudes of ethnoregionalist party voters towards European Union
Bartolini (1999) formulates th  hypothesis that electorates of traditional parties are more divided
than ethnoregionalist parties on the European Union-integration dimension as on other cleavages, like the
left-right? If this is the case, ethnoregionalist parties should profit from the decline left-right cleavage and
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politicisation of the European Union cleavage.
The more positive attitudes of ethnoregionalist party electorates and parties can be due to their
socio-demographic background characteristics (De Winter, 1998) but also to the catholic origin of most
ethnoregionalist parties. Catholicism internationalism has always favoured more pro European Union-
attitudes than protestant nationalism (Bartolini, 1999: 42). On the other hand, the “government thesis”
suggests that ethnoregionalist party voters would be more European Union-sceptical, voters in favour of
the government parties will tend to be more pro European Union given the fact that their parties and
leaders play a prominent role in the intergovernmental decision-making in the European Union, while
opposition party leaders are excluded.
Win the empirical section, we will verify which hypothesis is supported most by empirical data.
6. European demonstration effects
Transnational demonstration effects refer to the impact of the success of
ethnoregionalist/nationalist movements in one state on the development of self-confidence of similar
movements in other states and eventually to the founding of a genuine party. At the European level, these
demonstration effects are strongest if contacts between such movements are institutionalised, as is for
instance the case of the European Free Alliance. The European parliament offers to the ethnoregionalist
parties an arena for organising meetings, co-operation and the elaboration and articulation of a common
program. The Committee of the regions offers similar opportunities. Such cross-national inter-regional
networks can provide weaker movements with logistics, programmatic support, political status and
prestige, and, last but not least, boost their morale. Also, as in the case of the green parties, good
performance in European elections may have diffused their credibility (Mair, 1999).
III. ETHNOREGIONALIST PARTY ADAPTATION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. Pro-EU ideological change
From the arguments regarding the predominantly positive effect of the European Union on
ethnoregionalist parties, one could assume that in comparison with their main competitions, most
ethnoregionalist parties would tend to be more pro-EU, given the fact that the European Union offers
added value in terms of offices (EP and Committee of the Regions), votes (following their pro-EU
electorates) and policy (empowerment of regional actors, and the development of a European Union
regional policy). In fact, recent inventories of anti-EU parties do not contain a single ethnoregionalist
party (Taggart, 1998; Mair, 1999; Raunio & Wiberg, 2000).
We will verify these hypotheses looking at the EFA programmatic profile regarding European
Union integration, the expert placements of ethnoregionalist parties and their competitors on an European
Union integration scale and the European Union-attitudes of ethnoregionalist party electorates over time.
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1. The official position of the European Free Alliance towards the European Union
In spite of all the aspects of European integration that undermine the interests of the target
publics of ethnoregionalist parties, these parties have adopted - t le st since the first direct elections to the
European Parliament- favourable attitudes towards European integration.
The objectives of the DPPE-EFA with regard to European integration are the following: the
construction of an European Union of free peoples living in solidarity, founded on the principle of
subsidiarity; the defence of human rights and rights of peoples, and more in particular the right to self-
determination; the protection of the environment and a sustainable development; the construction of a just
society based on solidarity and progressive policies, social cohesion and equality of chances for all
citizens; the participation in European politics of parties that, due to their dimension, the electoral system
or the size of the territory they represent, are excluded from representation.
The principles and demands formulated in the EFA's manifesto prepared for the 1996
Intergovernmental Conference24 offer a more precise image of this party's pro-integrationist and federalist
stands: more supranationality in European Union decision-making, a social Europe parallel to the
European Monetary Union (including social convergence criteria); a common defence and foreign policy
beyond simple intergovernmentalism; enlargement of the European Union, but in concentric circles,
allowing to associate countries that cannot fulfil immediately all criteria, the centre states (the EMU
countries), co-operating on the basis of federalism; bicameralism: a directly elected Senate of the Peoples
and Regions, a sort of combination of the Committee of the Regions and the Council of the Regions; an
elected European government by a majority in the two chambers; the right of initiative of European,
national and regional parliaments as well as the Committee of the Regions; the creation of consultative
committees of MEPs, MNPs and regional MPs to improve co-operation between different parliaments; in
the short term, the representation of the regions in the Council of Ministers for the matters that are
devoluted in their country to the regional level, splitting the votes of the states in the Council of Ministers
between regions; assuring the direct access of regional authorities and the Committee of the Regions to
the European Court of Justice. However, they favour some intergovernmental decision rules: the use of
unanimity rule for cultural and citizenship matters and installing an alarm bell mechanism available to
regional assemblies that want to block European decisions that hurt vital interests of regions.
The ethnoregionalist parties that are not member of the DPPE-EFA but of one of the main
europarties are equally in favour of integration, and in general more strongly so than the official line of
their host party. However, even if about all ethnoregionalist parties are now defending European
integration, large divergences between these parties exist concerning the model of further integration the
European Union should pursue. Not all ethnoregionalist parties are euro-enthousiasts. Some, like the Lega
Nord, the SNP and the BNG are less in favour of the creation of a supranational Europe and promote
rather an intergovernmental or confederal model in which their regions would constitute a proper Nation-
state. In addition, even when many parties evoke an Europe of the Regions, a federal model with only two
levels (Europe and the regions) is not explicitly advanced. So the end of the state to which they belong is
not (yet) announced, though nearly all ethnoregionalist parties do demand a stronger presence of their
region in the delegations representing their country within European Union-institutions.
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Concerning the division of competencies between Europe, the state and the region, the positions
of ethnoregionalist parties vary between two poles: on the one hand, the desire to transfer massively entire
policy sectors to the European level (generally competencies that at this moment still are exercised by the
states, but whose scope is too transnational or comprehensive to be efficiently exercised at the regional
level, like defence and foreign policy, monetary and fiscal policy, large scale public works, the
environment, security etc., but also employment policy), and on the other hand, the expansion of the
competencies of the regions at the cost of the European Union, a position rarely defended in spite of the
fact that in most electoral manifestos and ideological charts, lipservice to the sacred basic principle of
subsidiarity is regularly paid (and not surprisingly is interpreted only in its bottom-up version).
2. The evolution of European Union-attitudes of individual ethnoregionalist parties
Ray's (1999) expert survey data on the European Union-attitudes  in the 1984-1996 period
indicates:
1) that the regionalist party family is the most pro-European of all European party families,
with an average, for the entire period, of 5.82 on a 7 point scale (from 1: “strongly opposed”, to
7: “strongly in favour”). This is already the case in 1984 and 1988. In 1992, the ethnoregionalist
parties are beaten by Conservative parties and Social Democrats, the latter remaining ahead also
in 1996. If we look only at the five countries in which regionalist parties exist, the most-
outspoken pro-EU attitudes of ethnoregionalist parties are confirmed only for 1984, as since
1988 they are systematically beaten by the Social democrats.
2) Country analysis shows that in none of the five countries in which regionalist parties exist,
they are the party family with the most pro-EU attitudes in the entire period. In Belgium the
three traditional parties are more pro-EU than the VU and FDF; in Spain the regionalist family is
beaten by the conservatives, liberals and social democrats, in Italy by the liberals, christian-
democrats and social-democrats, in the UK by the liberals, and in Finland by the conservatives.
3) Thus, if we select only the five countries in which regionalist parties exist, they ar  (apart
for 1984) systematically beaten by social-democrats.
4) If we take all countries together, the regionalists are the most homogenous party family in
terms of standard deviations of their European Union attitudes. However, in the five countries in
which regionalist parties exist, the greens are most cohesive, followed by the social-democrats,
and only then come the regionalists.
5) The regionalist party family has grown gradually more pro European (from 5.65 in 1984,
5.73 in 1988, 5.96 in 1992 and 1996. But apart from the greens (that have become more sceptical
in these countries), all other families have also become more pro-EU (christian-democrats
remain about status quo), the conservatives the strongest.
To conclude, generally speaking the regionalists are surely pro-European, but within the relevant
countries, they were European Union-champions only in the very beginning, while differences with
traditional parties have declined over time. Hence, one cannot claim that the regionalist parties have made
a major shift in favour of the European Union, they were already in favour, just have grown even more
so, but not as dramatically as some other families, that have caught up with them (especially the Social-
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democrats).
While the existing expert data of Ray are surely a valuable source for placing domestic parties
on a European Union integration scale, the reliability of retrospective expert surveys has been questioned
(Budge, 2000) and therefore they clearly have to be complemented by longitudinal content analysis of
party policy statements, like the manifestos for the European elections since 1979, which could be coded
following the new scheme developed by Hix (1999) or Goldmann's project (2001) content analysis of the
national and party positions (on the SEA, TEU and Amsterdam Treaty)25.
B. Shifts of ethnoregionalist party voters' attitudes
When comparing the ethnoregionalist parties as party-in-the-electorate, with other party families,
one should use data collected at the regional level, i.e. at the level of the ethnoregionalist parties' target
electorate, rather than national level data (De Winter, 1998)26. This is even more necessary for the
comparison of the European Union attitudes of voters. Most ethnoregionalist parties are active in interface
regions, bordering with other states, or have particular links with the populations across the state border.
This border-proximity probably has a transnational socialising effect on the entire population of the
border region, while part of the national electoral may be very isolated, being not close to any other
nation (cf. the northern peripheral regions of Italy vis-à-vis the South). Or Flanders' close cultural ties
with the Netherlands, the Swedish population in Southern Finland vis-à-vis Sweden and Denmark, or
Catalonia and the Basque Country vis-à-vis their linguistic sister regions in France.
Given the fact that the small size of ethnoregionalist parties' scores in national surveys of the
Eurobarometers, one has to be careful interpreting the results. In fact, only the magnum Eurobarometer of
1996 (overall population size = 65.178) offers sufficient numbers for most ethnoregionalist parties. So
only for 1996 we can test systematically whether the hypothesis of a pro-EU ethnoregionalist party
electorate holds, in comparison with the electorates of non-ethnoregionalist parties.
The hypothesis is confirmed for Flanders, as the VU voters27 display the most pro European
Union attitudes but the Greens obtain about the same score. In Brussels, we had to run the analysis on
party proximity (rather than vote intention), as this produced more FDF sympathisers28. The FDF is
clearly beaten by all traditional Francophone parties!
For Finland, we selected the two mega-regions in which the SFP is clearly strongly represented
(over 5% or more, i.e. Uusimaa and Voili-Suomi). The SFP is clearly beaten by the Conservatives
(KOK), but also by the Social-Democrats and the Greens. In Italy we can only check for the Lega Nord in
the northern provinces. There the LN is clearly beaten by the various christian-democrat formations, the
Greens, the PDS as well as Forza Italia. Thus basically, it is the most eurosceptic of the main formations!
This distrust towards the European Union was already noticeable in a 1992 survey (Diamanti, 1993).
In Scotland, the SNP electorate is more Eurosceptical than the electorates of all main parties! In
Wales, the PC is however the most pro-EU party together with the liberal-democrats.
In Spain:
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- the PA is the most pro-EU party in Andalucia, together with the PSOE,
- in Aragon, the PAR is beaten by the PSOE,
- in the Canary Island, the CC is the least pro-EU party,
- in Catalonia, the most pro-EU party is the PSC-PSOE, followed by the CIU, while the
independist ERC is the least, together with the IU,
- in Galicia, the BNG is beaten by the PSOE,
- in Valencia the UV is the least pro-EU party,
- in the Basque country the EA is the most pro-EU party, followed by the PSOE, then the PNV,
while HB is the least pro-EU party.
Hence the analysis of target electorates shows that most ethnoregionalist parties are not EU-
champions at all, contrary to their ideological profile and discourse of their leaders (and scores on the Ray
survey). Thus they seem to be out of line with their electorates. The ease they seem cope with this
representational deficit can be related to the fact the EU-matters generally do not matter very much to
their electorates, and therefore the party leadership is allowed to adopt more pro-EU attitudes on this low
saliency dimension.
Of course, the traditional parties' position is also determined by the attitudes of their electorates
in other regions, therefore if one makes the analysis at the national level, one finds that:
- in Spain the CiU is the most pro-EU party together with the PSOE, while most of the smaller
formations are also more pro-EU than the PP,
- in the UK the PC is together with the Labour party the most pro-EU, followed by the SNP ex
aequo with the liberal-democrats,
- in Belgium the VU is the most pro-EU together with the two green parties but the FDF remains
most sceptical (but less than the Vlaams Blok),
- in Finland, the SFP stands ex aqua with the greens, but is beaten by the conservatives and the
social-democrats,
- while in Italy the LN is ex aequo with the ANbut beaten by everybody else apart from the
communists (RC).
Thus, the analysis at the national level enhances the EU-standing of a number of ethnoregionalist
parties, but still they are not the outspoken champions as they pretend.
To what extent have ethnoregionalist parties relative EU-attitudes evolved over time. One would
expect that they would have become more pro-EU and more so than the traditional party families (given
their supposed conversion to the European Union after the invention of the Europe of the Regions). Given
the problem of small numbers, we merged two or three Eurobarometers held just before or after the
European elections, as only these contain data on party preferences.
In Belgium, in the 1978-1979 period29 the Flemish socialists were slightly more pro-EU than the
VU, while the liberals and christian-democrats are less (in the Flemish constituencies without Brussels).
In Brussels, the FDF was the second most pro-EU party after the Brussels Liberals, followed by the
socialists and christian-democrats. In Scotland the SNP was the least pro-EU party (while the
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conservatives are the most!). Also in Wales the PC was the least pro-EU, while the conservatives and the
liberals were the most. Thus only in the case of the SNP and PC, there seems to be some thorough change
in favour towards Europe.
In 198930 (but only with 9 respondents)31, the Lega was the least pro-EU of all Italian parties. In
the autumn of 1994, the most pro-EU parties were the PPI, PDS and RC, then the LN, and the least were
FI and the AN32.
C. Organisational change
One of the most evident organisational changes to be expected of the ethnoregionalist parties
turning more pro-EU would be the empowerment of European Union-officeholders. To what extent have
MEPs, members of the Committee of the Regions, national MPs specialising in European Union-
questions, and other European Union-party experts and spokesmen party been included into the leading
party bodies (Raunio, 2000).
Unfortunately, due to the traditional and recent neglect of ethnoregionalist parties in the
comparative study of political parties, we have only very little data at hand for checking this hypothesis
without going into extensive data collection33.
In the 1960-2000 period, organisational empowerment of European Union-officials in the VU
appears from the inclusion in the party executive (Partijbestuur) between 1988 and 1991, and since 1994,
ex officio the group leader of the VU in the European Parliament (where the size of the group varies
between 1 and 2 MEPs....), and since 1989 in the larger, and more powerful, Party Council (Partij Raad).
But also most other Belgian parties have included their MEPs or a delegate of them into their highest
decision making body, and usually, the main parties did so earlier than the VU. In the FDF the MEPs
have been included since the beginning, as party statutes have always included all MPs (of any type) in
the Comité Permanent.
In Spain, the situation seems to be as follows:
- CDC: a spokesperson of the EP group (at least since the 1995 statutes, and not before 1986,
Marcet 1987) sits in the national executive,
- ERC: the statutes do not seem (according to Molas, 2000: 82) to include MEPs (at this moment
they do not have any), but the responsible person for International Contacts is current member of the
Executiva National, s well as alderman of Barcelona and former delegate to the EFA),
- PNV: no mentions in the 2000 statutes (not for executive, not even for national congress). The
present MEP is not member of the national or regional party Executives,
- EA: the current MEP is also Secretary General of the Party and member of the national
executive (Ejecutiva Nacional), but not ex officio, while the person responsible for the International
Relations is so,
- BNG: the current MEP is member of the executive Comisión Permanente34.
In the SNP, one of the 2 MEPs is member of the NEC (as one of the 10 elected members, but not
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ex officio, as are the “national office bearers”). In the Lega Nord, there is one EP-group representative in
the Consiglio Federale (according to the 1998 statutes). In the UV, their only MEP is member of the
Comité Fédéral (but, according to 1997 statutes, not ex officio)35. In the StVP all types of MPs are
member of the Party Commission (Parteiausschuss), but not of the Parteileitung. In the PsdAz, MEPs not
officially member of Direzione Nazionale, but a representation of MEPs is granted for the Consiglio
Nazionale. Finally, in the SFP, the current MEP is not member of the Centralstyrelsen.
Generally, MEPS of ethnoregionalist parties are member of their party's top leadership organs,
but often not ex officio. Thus their representation is little institutionalised. On the other hand, they all
serve as the specialist, policy initiators and spokesman for their party on European matters. Still, like in
most traditional parties, there seems to be little communication between the party on the ground and their
representatives in Brussels.
Thus, some major data collection work is still to be done, in the line of Katz & Mair, especially
for the earlier periods. In addition, the formal inclusion of European Union-officials in the leading party
bodies is just a very small part of the picture. It does not tell us to what extent has their actual influence
increased in the party. What is the prestige, influence, authority, network integration of European Union-
officers within the party organisation? We will try to answer this question the following months through
interviews with ethnoregionalist party MEPs as well as with longstanding party apparatchicks of the
respective ethnoregionalist parties. European Union-officials may be ex-officio unimportant, but de facto
be important through interlocking directorates. They may hold an “insignificant” seat in the European
Parliament, but also hold important national or regional offices, and as such be represented in the parties'
highest decision-making bodies, and therefore contribute to the oligarchisation of the party decision-
making in European Union-matters (cf. the Mair thesis). Thus, we have to examine the cumul des
mandats at, on the one hand, the European Union level, and on the other hand the national and regional
public office, as well as the non-elected intraparty leadership positions.
The formal inclusion of European Union-officials in the leading party bodies is just a very small
part of the picture. It does not tell us to what extent has their actual influence increased in the party. What
is the prestige, influence, authority, network integration of European Union-officers within the party
organisation? We will try to answer this question the following months through interviews with
ethnoregionalist party MEPs as well as with longstanding party apparatchicks of the respective
ethnoregionalist parties. European Union-officials may be ex-officio unimportant, but de facto be
important through interlocking directorates. They may hold an “insignificant” seat in the European
Parliament, but also hold important national or regional offices, and as such be represented in the parties'
highest decision-making bodies, and therefore contribute to the oligarchisation of the party decision-
making in European Union-matters (cf. the Mair thesis). Thus, we have to examine the cumul des
mandats at, on the one hand, the European Union level, and on the other hand the national and regional
public office, as well as the non-elected intraparty leadership positions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The process of europeanisation is particular relevant to ethnoregionalist parties, that, as it were,
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“own” problems related to centre-periphery cleavages, the division of policy competences between
territorial decision-making levels. Thus, more than for other party families, European integration strikes
at the heart of the cleavage on which this party family is build, i.e. the empowerment/dispowerment of a
higher level decision-making centre and the regional periphery opposition.
For a variety of reasons, as integration proceeded these parties have not turned into
Euroscepticals, rather on the contrary. This is due to the fact that the opportunities for the development of
ethnoregionalist parties and the empowerment of the regional populations they represent outweigh the
constraints europeanisation poses. This europhile stands can be noticed in their multilevel federalist
institutional arrangements, and the attitudes of the party elites. However, their electorates seems to be less
euro-enthusiastic.
Like is the case with the study of the effects of europeanisation on other party families, some
major data collection work on organisational changes is still to be done, in the line of Katz & Mair,
especially for the earlier periods. Also the evolution of the positions of these parties in a three-
dimensional space (type of autonomy sought, left-right, european integrationism) requires more detailed
analysis. Also shifts in multilevel career patterns and planning can further reveal the impact of
europeanisation on party elites.
Table
The Democratic Party of the Peoples of Europe-European Free Alliance as a representative of a European political
family (November 2000) (in brackets the number of MEPs, and for non-members of the DPPE-EFA, the
parliamentary groups to which they belong)
Bloque Nacionalista Galego (1)Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (2, PLDR)
Eusko Alkartasuna (1) Coalición Canaria (1, PLDR)
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya E sk l Herritarrok (1, non-inscrit)
Fryske Nasjonale Partij Lega Nord (4, Groupe Technique & non-inscrit)
Mouvement Région Savoie Svenska Folkpartiet (1, PLDR)
Partei Deutchsprachiger BelgierSüd-tiroler Volkspartei (1,PPE)
Partido Sardo d’Azione
Partit Occitan
Plaid Cymru (2)
Scottish National Party (2)
Slovenska Skupnost
Union Démocratique Bretonne
Union für Südtirol
Union du Peuple Alsacien
Union Valdôtaine (1)*
Unione di u Populu Corsu/Scelta Nova
Unitat Catalana
Volksunie (2)
Eusko Alderdi Jertzailea - Partido Nacionalista Vasco (1)**
Partido Andalucista (1)
Ligue Savoisienne***
Veneti d'Europa***
Libertà Emiliana-Nazione Emilia***
Vinhozito-Rainbow***
(Source: DPPE-EFA; Group Greens-EFA)
* In July 2000, Mr. Caveri, the leader of the Union Valdôtaine (founding member of the EFA) succeed a MEP of the
Prodi list. He decided to continue to sit with the group of his predecessor, the ELDR!
** The PNV abandonned the EPP in 1999 and obtained observer status in the EFA. Others have also ask for observer
status: the Partit Socialista de Mallorca-Entesa Nacionalista, Bloc Nacionalista Valencià
*** Since November 2000
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NOTES
1. Cf. the co-signing of the five party secretary-generals of the appeal to the Commission for drafting a European
Party Statute (17/2/2000).
2. These parties exist however in nearly all European Union member states. In several of them, they are party
system relevant, either in terms of the size of their electoral support, or in terms of participation or blackmail
potential in the formation of government coalitions between statewide parties. Second, in Belgium and Italy,
ethnoregionalist parties has contributed to the demise of existing party systems and in the long run may
contribute to the break-up of these countries. Finally, they seem capable, together with the Greens and the
populist right-wing parties, to cash in to the recent increases of public dissatisfaction towards the established
political elites and traditional political parties (Müller-Rommel, 1998; Norris, 1999).
3. Directly or indirectly inspired by the work (often in progress) of and/or conversations with: Stefano Bartolini,
Elisabeth Bomberg, Sergio Fabbrini, Richard Katz, Michael Keating, Robert Ladrech, Gary Marks, Leonardo
Morlino, Wolfgang Müller, Tapio Raunio, and Kaare Strøm.
4. Only those working on parties in federal systems may face similar problems (Deschouwer, 2000).
5. Or as evoked by the Lega as “un centralismo mostruoso perché ancora iù lont o e incontrolabile di quello
odierno”.
6. Spain for instance does not at all offer European Union-representation of regions in matters in which they have
(shared or exclusive) competence. For instance, the Basque country has nearly all competencies of normal state
except money and defence (that will be transferred upwards anyway), but excludes this empowered regions
from representation through the Spanish European Union representation in Council. While the British ministers
do allow once in a while a Scottish or Welsh minister to accompany them to Brussels, and Germans seem to
have some rotation system allowing at least one regional minister (representing the Länder) to accompany the
Bundesminister.
7. Apart from the Rainbow group in the 1989-1994 period that comprised nine EFA MEPs on a total of 15.
8. Finally, the fate of the EFA has for two decades been strongly dependent on the support of the Volksunie, in
terms of ideological sophistication, strategic insight, persistence and material resources (finance and personnel).
The internal crisis of the VU in the 1990s about its raison-d'être and its future, also threatened the survival of
the EFA-co-operation (De Winter, 1998). Most recently, this dependency is in decline, as the numerical weight
of VU in the EFA has declined in relative terms, while also a number of key positions in the EFA have now
shifted to other parties. But the presidency is still in the hands of the VU.
9. And in the parliament, they are marginal given the dominance of large coaliti ns between EPP & PSE.
10. This absence is not compensated by their rather fair representation in the Committee of the Regions and in the
European Parliament.
11. EFA officials argue that the current lack of EFA-members in East-Eastern Europe is due to the fact that the
EFA is afraid of allying itself with politically incorrect parties that would harm its image (in a much stronger
way than it harms the traditional party families, cf. the criticism formulated when the Lega was EFA member
and joined a government with the AN). In addition, they claim to follow political developments in these
countries closely and explore the market of potential new EFA members.
12. Bartolini (1999: 34) argues that the current degree of integration is a status quo that is positive for liberal and
conservative parties, but negative to social democrats that want to go beyond common market and create social
Europe and expand European Union powers into the political management of the economy and welfare state.
Hence, the latter parties may tend to boost their integration given the fact that they also would like the European
Union to become more integrated and federal, while other party families can be happy with a interparty co-
operation that does not call for loosing part of the parties and countries sovereignty. The current state of the
Union is suboptimal and undesirable for the ethnoregionalist parties, as they are in fervour of a stronger
integrated Europe (and therefore a weakening of the state levels), but they also want a stronger involvement of
the regions in European Union decision-making.
13. Cf. the number of regional and town networks, the number of associations created to lobby the Commission,
and of other Community institutions as well.
14. The leaders of the Catalan and Flemish governments tend to travel with the attitude of a head of state and are
frequently treated in this manner (Malloy, 1995: 9).
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15. Cf. the evolution of the traditional parties in Belgium (De Winter & Dumont, 1999) and Spain (Colomé, 1989).
16. With the insertion of regional political and civic society actors into the European decision making process, and
the extension of the subsidiarity principle to the regions, the regional level also contributes to the legitimisation
of the integration process and therefore tends do reduce the democratic deficit.
17. At the 1989 European elections, the Corsican (Unione di u Populu Corsu) and Brussels (Front Démocratique
des Francophones) ethnoregionalist parties formed an electoral alliance with green lists (Olivesi 1998). At the
1984 European elections, the Union Valdôtaine formed a cartel with the Partito Sarde d’Azione.
18. Another cartel, the Union de Regiones (comprising regionalist formations of Almería, Baleares, Castilla-La
Mancha, Canarias and Madrid [!]) obtained only 0,04% of the votes.
19. Yet, after one or two decades, most of the specific sociodemographic features of the ethnoregionalist electorates
tend to fade away (De Winter, 1998: 232-234).
20. Reif, 1985; Van Der Eijk & Franklin, 1996. For a recent empirical critique of this model, see Blondel, Sinnott
& Svensson, 1998.
21. At the general elections, on average 62% of the incumbent governing parties loose votes at the next general
elections (Müller & Strøm, 1997: 744).
22. Analysis of the performances of most significant ethnoregionalist parties (those that obtained in 1999 at least
5% of the votes in their region) at the European and general elections since 1979 (or since the adhesion of their
country to the European Union) comparing their scores measured at the level of the region.
23. Regionalist parties are overrepresented in terms of seats, in comparison to the share of vote at the European
elections in 1999, in Belgium, the UK, underrepresented in Spain and France, while equally represented in
Italy. But given the fact that most regionalist parties do better at the European elections than at the national
elections, one could say that in office terms, the European Parliament (at least in 1999) is relatively more
beneficial to regionalist parties. But this good result in 1999 is due to the major increase in seats (from 14 to 20)
as many regionalist parties hold the last marginal seat.
24. This is still the most valid and elaborated EFA-view on institutional questions.
25. For some of the scarce case studies of the European Union-attitudes of ethnoregionalist parties, see Beyers &
Kerremans (2001) on the VU, Lega (Diamanti, 1993), Lynch (1996) on the VU, the Union Démocratique
Bretonne, the SNP and PC; Macartney (1990) on the SNP.
26. Ethnoregionalist parties usually do not intend to capture votes in the entire electorate of a state, but try to
maximise their electoral support in the region or from ethnic groups on which they focus. Therefore, the
success of a nationalist party should not be measured in terms of the proportion of the national vote, but only in
terms the proportion of the targeted electorate, the votes of the region they pretend to represent. This type of
measurement offers a more precise appreciation of the electoral success of ethnoregionalist parties.
27. Voters are defined in terms of voting intention for next general election.
28. Eight instead of four, probably due to the fact that for all but local elections, since 1993, runs all elections in a
cartel with the Francophone liberals.
29. EB 10, EB11, EB12 (fall 1978, spring and fall 1979 respectively).
30. For Spain in 1989 there seems to be something wrong with the representation of the regions
(underrepresentation of Catalunya, Basque, etc.) as well as with the coding of ethnoregionalist parties.
31. But note that in the entire 1988-1992 period, there are only 19 Lega voters in the Eurobarometers containing
party preference data!
32. Also in the pre-electoral spring 1994 survey, those that voted LN in the previous national elections were
amongst the most sceptical (but for different dependent variable: European Union-membership good/bad thing).
33. The Katz Mair Data handbook contains organisational data on the VU -which just has been updated by
(Bernollet, De Neve, 2000)-, but not on the FDF, while data on ethnoregionalist parties in Italy and the UK are
lacking from those country chapters, Spain is absent all together, while the SFP is included in the Finnish
chapter (but not for the relevant period (post-1995).
34. As well as the Consello Nacional.
24
35. But all regional and national MPs (=1) are represented in the Conse l Fédéral, while in the 1993 statutes they
were also ex officio member of the executive.
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